



In 1971, over twenty years ago, Evzen Neustupnfs award-winning essay on the future
of archaeology - "Whither Archaeology?" - appeared in the journal Antiquity. Its
thought-provoking commentary was a welcome signal from the heart of Continental Europe
that a major revolution was occurring in the fundamental theory of our discipline, not just
in "New Archaeology" in United States and in a few British archaeology departments, but
in avant-garde pockets of innovative archaeologists in the wider world.
The central theme of Evzen Neustupny's article was the polarisation within traditional
Archaeology between those scholars grounding their research in positivism, empiricism and
materialism, and the contrasted school of "Romantic", historically-grounded scholarship.
Whilst the former all-too-often remained overcautiously in the confines of refining typology,
chronology and with the scientific analysis of material culture, the latter overambitiously
created pseudo-historic narratives of past peoples and tried to reconstruct all aspects of their
society through uncritical appeal to ethnographic and historic analogues and modern
experience of the world.
During the decade of the 1970s and into the early 1980s the challenge set by Evzen
Neustupn$ was met within the formal agenda of the New or Processual Archaeology
movement. The groundwork for reconciling the polarised communities had already been laid
in a series of provocative papers by Binford and his associates during the 1960s and in David
Clarke's extraordinary programmatic textbook Analytical Archaeology of 1968. The mature
application of a unified Arts-Science or more specifically Anthropological-Scientific
Archaeology impacted on a worldwide scale through paradigmatic case-studies and
syntheses by scholars such as Colin Renfrew in European prehistory, the Scandinavian
regional prehistorians such as Kristian Kristiansen and Klavs Randsborg, and American
scholars producing syntheses and regional case-studies in Mesoamerica.
The central building-block of Processual Archaeology was the indissoluble bond
between Models and Scientific Verification. Archaeologists would achieve ever-closer
approximations to the nature and developmental trajectories of past societies through the
dynamic interplay between increasingly sophisticated specific applications of general models
and the explicit testing of these operational models against new and better databases. In
contrast to the caution of the traditional empiricists, New Archaeologists argued that an
anthropological approach to material culture would allow archaeologists to model social and
ideological systems as well as the more easily-approachable economic and technological
aspects of past communities. But equally, in deliberate contrast to traditional "Romantic"
Culture - Historical Archaeologists, Processual Archaeologists insisted that interpretations
relying on ethnohistoric analogy or contemporary experience were worthless unless verifiable
through scientific validation against statistically-meaningful, archaeological databases.
I cannot think of a finer example of the New Archaeology in its maturity than Kent
Flannery's edited volume of 1976, "The Early Mesoamerican Village". Formative era
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farming communities are analysed from all conceivable dimensions imagined at that time:
social scales from the family to the expansionist state, ecological and economic perspectives
broaden from site catchment to interregional geography and networks of exchange, modes
of investigation range across the entire spectrum from the physical analysis of artefact
composition to the religious symbols and mental universes of the peoples concerned. Particularly
welcome and generally novel were two features recurring throughout the book: a delicious sense
of humour, and a self-questionning and personalized series of discourses between semi-fictional
representatives of the dominant contemporary approaches to the archaeological record.
From such a highpoint, how could the discipline of Archaeology go anywhere but into
ever-better fusion and interpénétration of social and physical science? One confidently
expected to see case-study applications such as Flannery's appearing for every region of the
globe, each one finer-tuned and more insightful than the last.
Looking back from the vantage-point of the early 1990s, it is undeniable that the vision
of 1976 has remained unfulfilled, whilst few would dispute that the interdisciplinary,
scientific approach to the past, represented by Flannery's team, has been rejected by the
leading sector of recent archaeological theory - the Post-Processual movement.
Since the early 1980s Post-Processualists, led by Ian Hodder, have turned away from
Clarke and Binford's aim to convert Archaeology into a "scientific anthropology of the past",
diverting our attention towards theoretical agendas derived from self-consciously
"Humanistic" movements in Philosophy, Literary Theory and Sociology. A vast and
seemingly-unbridgeable gulf has reemerged between empirical, validation-committed
archaeologists whose insights now tend to be "middle-range" in scope and those who ground
their wide-ranging interpretations on ethnohistoric or personal ideological models rather than
"bottom-up" induction from the archaeological data. Some characteristic examples will
illustrate today's situation.
In Britain most of the funding for postgraduate research in Archaeology comes from
the government, and is largely earmarked for Archaeological Science projects: for the most
part the topics for PhD research are smallscale problems of archaeozoology, artefact
characterisation and suchlike that make no pretence to be offering direct insights into central
questions regarding ancient societies. In direct contrast, and clearly poles apart in approach,
was John Barrett's contribution to the 1993 TAG (Theoretical Archaeology Group)
Conference (undeniably the key theory meeting in Europe each year): in keeping with several
other leading Post-Processualists, he proposed the writing of Prehistory from one's personal
ideology without regard to the constraints or possibilities of the archaeological record.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the message of "Whither Archaeology?" is once again
of critical relevance to the future of our discipline, since we are assuredly back to the
polarised situation Evzen Neustupnj portrayed a generation ago.
There are two important questions to resolve: firstly, how have we come to regress
from disciplinary unity during these past twenty years? And secondly, if we were to desire
a renewed integration of Arts and Science within Archaeology (in itself a point of major
disagreement) how could this be achieved in a more lasting fashion?
Let me start with explaining the disintegration of the grand project of disciplinary synthesis.
Disciplinary renewal and "the generation game"
I belong to a generation of archaeologists that commenced university study of the subject in
the 1960s. By virtue of being both an undergraduate and postgraduate at Cambridge, I was
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fortunate enough to experience the mystical pull of several gurus (a phenomenon for which
Cambridge is renowned/notorious): parallel oracles such as David Clarke and Richard
Charley (representing positivistic New Archaeology and New Geography respectively), and
alternative oracles such as Eric Higgs with his subversive Ecological Determinism. After
I left Cambridge and up to the present day, fan Hodder has adopted the resident guru status
in place of those sadly departed intellectual leaders.
One has to be honest: messianic figures exercise their appeal through the emotions first
and foremost; they claim special insight into the world and its workings, which they intimate
you just can't get from other teachers; indeed one is positively discouraged from taking
seriously and even reading non-approved works of clearly redundant approaches. As
a disciple of such a guru one feels "select" and very different from other students, who are
wasting their time pursuing traditional or merely alternative kinds of research. A primary
aim in conference papers or periodical publications for an aspirant core member of a guru's
circle is to demonstrate one's intellectual credentials and right-thinking: this requires regular
citation of the hallowed authorities whose "gospels" contain the central tenets of the
approach. These techniques of "locking in" younger researchers to a narrow intellectual
perspective, with its corollary the "locking out" of research publications lacking the
"movement's" approval, I have termed "bibliographic exclusion" (Bintliff 1991). Although
I could give many examples from my own experience of such practises in the Clarkian and
Higgsian schools, it is more important to draw to your awareness the ongoing process in
connexion with the "Post-Processual" movement.
The coining "Post-" immediately serves to write off as redundant all those working in
a New Archaeological framework who refuse to adopt the Hodder (Shanks-Tilley) agenda,
submission to which is shown through citation obeisance to the pantheon of newly-appointed
church fathers (Foucault, Derrida, Bourdieu, Habermas, Heidegger, etc.). A small anecdote
illustrates the day-to-day activity of mind-closure that ensures doctrinal purity for the true
disciple: I recently organized a symposium on evolutionary theory, and had the good fortune
to persuade a thinker of world renown, Professor Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard University,
to cross the Atlantic and give the keynote address. On hearing this, a leading
Post-Processualist announced that no self-respecting follower of that movement would wish
to be seen at such an address. Knowing Gould's works very thoroughly, I cannot recall
anything he wrote which could cause offence to Post-Processualists. But that assuredly isn't
the point: a dedicated follower of Post-Processualism wouldn't want to hear Gould because
of what he hasn't written. He isn't following the sacred texts and has different stories to tell,
so therefore he is beyond potential interest.
This conscious mind-closure extends through published literature back through the
centuries, so that a lineage of "correct" thinkers is established and everyone else ignored.
Hodder (1989), for example, exhorts us to reject scientific forms of field research report
which strive for objectivity, and return to the subjective chat and speculation of the 18th
century Antiquarians. Whilst this need not be taken too seriously, unless you are a complete
relativist, Hodder would appear to me making a more useful contribution when he asks for
archaeologists to offer personal insights into their procedures alongside the technical results
normally published in the third person, "impersonally". Well, how about these extracts from
the personal testimony of an American archaeologist, frustrated at the conservative
methodology of his academic supervisor and trying desperately to try novel approaches to
excavation:
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"Two days later we started the excavations at the Andrews site. We cleaned back the areas around
the features and worked meticulously to uncover each little detail of association. Griffin had told
us if we hit anything to call him immediately. Instead we waited until we had the features fully
exposed, each artifact in situ, clearly identifiable with respect to the things around it.
We made a mistake - we had not plotted everything on our record sheets before calling
Griffin. We... called Griffin from a nearby service station... and before long Griffin came
screeching to a halt in front of the site... Griffin jumped down onto our clean trowelled sand floor
getting on his knees beside the extended burial. 'Give me a trowel,' he yelled. Mark tossed him
a trowel; I held my head...
That afternoon, Griffin returned to Ann Arbor leaving us with a series of holes in our
excavations... The artifacts were carried back to Ann Arbor...
Quite clearly, our long-range programme for Michigan archaeology had to change... We
had to ensure that good records were kept for each exposed floor and for each feature... Mark
and I worked on developing a field manual and a series of data-recording forms...
We began the dangerous game of playing hide and seek with Griffin himself. We didn't
really tell him what we were up to as we took students off and made decisions without consulting
him...
Griffin surprised us many times: Mark and I had assumed that he wouldn't go along with
spending the money for having record forms printed. We contacted the helpful amateurs in hopes
of finding a way to get the printing done at no cost. Griffin found out and was hurt. 'Take them
out and get them printed,' he said...
We got many different kinds of data which were not generally collected. In fact, the hall
outside Griffin's office was filled with fire-cracked rock; the newly-opened lab was filled with
fire-cracked rock. When Griffin saw all this rock the expression on his face... was one of total
disbelief: 'What in God's name are you going to do with all that fire-cracked rock?' I answered
knowingly, 'Why, count and weigh it, of course.' What I could possibly do with such data,
I didn't know, but it was part of the archaeological record, and there must be something you
could learn.
Griffin was sometimes unbelievably tolerant: He supplied the assistants to count and weigh
the rock. I don't think anyone ever did anything with that data. My justification for its collection
was simple: If you are using statistics in analysis, the larger the sample the better. The most
common item on the sites we were digging was fire-cracked rock. It follows therefore that it was
the most important item, statistically speaking, that is. My logic was perfect.
I do recall being upset when Griffin refused to spend the time cataloguing the coke bottle
tops and the nails recovered from the excavated plough zone. Looking back, if Griffin was
impossible, then Mark and I must have been nothing short of intolerable."
This passage was written by none other than Lewis Binford, the acknowledged founder
and leading thinker of the New Archaeology movement. It describes events in 1957-8, and
was published by Binford in 1972 as an autobiographical commentary to a reprinting of his
classic paper on archaeological sampling strategies ("A consideration of archaeological
research design", American Antiquity 1964; Binford 1972, 126-128). It does all, and more,
than Hodder was to ask for 17 years later in the name of Post-Processual innovation, and
actually is only part of a series of volumes in which at regular intervals Binford has provided
a subjective account of the biographical context to his "scientific" papers. Hodder, by
discounting any thought of cumulative scholarship, and striving to write-off the preceding
generation(s), remains unaware of Binford's progressive achievements in the writing of
archaeological reports.
On a broader front, since Post-Processualism is grounded in a revival of philosophical
Idealism, where the world is for all intents and purposes what conscious humans make it, it
becomes necessary to discard all the accumulated insights into human beings and human
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society given to us by earlier gurus such as Freud or Darwin and their followers. I confess
to being rather amazed at a grander step of knowledge deletion, also witnessed at the 1993
TAG Conference: a friend whose work in Environmental Archaeology I have always deeply
admired, but whose department is known to have been overrun by Post-Processualists, made
a public auto-da-fé by anchoring his paper on human awareness of landscape to a Medieval
illustration of the Cosmos with the Earth and Man at its centre (whoops - there went Galileo
and Copernicus!)
Contextualizing intellectual movements
But where do new mini-paradigms come from? Do they emerge, like Athena from Zeus'
thigh, fully-fledged from the mighty brain and soul of the founding guru? From our
favourable vantage-point of the 1990s, we can look back over recent theoretical movements
and pronounce a very definite No to that proposition. New Archaeology, the Higgsian
Palaeoeconomy movement, and Post-Processual archaeology, are not isolated phenomena
owing their existence to unique, insightful individuals.
New Archaeology was a belated, local manifestation of "new format" approaches that
became dominant in a wide swathe of disciplines from the late 1950s into the 1970s, typified
by "Physics-envy", quantitative methodologies, generalized model-using, and attempts at
Arts-Science integration (cf. the development of post-War theory in Sociology, Social
Anthropology, History, Geography, Biology). In turn, recent research into the history of these
other disciplines has "contextualized" this wide movement into the central intellectual trend
of the first half of this century and the last quarter of the 19th century - one typified by grand
modelling, central planning, scientism and positivism (Bintliff 1986,1993).
If we turn now to the Higgsian Palaeoeconomic movement, this may seem a slighter
affair from the limited publications of Higgs himself, yet becomes immensely influential
when you consider the many notable presentday researchers whose work remains heavily
influenced by Higgsian theory (Graeme Barker, Geoff Bailey, Clive Gamble, Robin Dennell,
Paul Halstead, Iain Davidson, Derek Sturdey, Jim Lewthwaite, merely to name a few). The
Palaeoeconomic approach arose to brief but extreme popularity ihe late 1960s and early
1970s, just at the lime when Ecology emerged from its esoteric academic chrysalis as a major
intellectual world force.
What can we say about Post-Processualism? Once again, its sacred authors and basic tenets
show no divergence from identical revisionary movements in related disciplines (especially
Geography, Sociology and Social Anthropology), all of which can be subsumed under the
broader umbrella of the Post-Modern movement. In penetrating critiques, against which no
serious defence has been offered, Frederick Jameson and David Harvey have "contexlualized"
Post-Modernism as an intellectual by-product of the major economic and political changes
that have occurred in the Western advanced economy nations since the mid-1970s
(post-Fordism, flexible economics, anti-welfarism, neo-conservatism; Bintliff 1991, 1993).
If the preceding comments on the "sociology" of archaeological theory are accurate,
then there are some advantages but a far greater list of disadvantages to the way in which
our discipline is evolving.
On the plus side, "gurus" provide a generational focus to inspire young researchers to
open up new pathways to the past or explore new areas of data. Secondly, by "jumping on
"Whither archaeology?" revisited 29
the bandwaggon" of the latest intellectual fad, archaeologists feel their work is part of a much
wider - and hence surely more significant and less parochial - intellectual project.
The negative effects include the following:
1. "Mind-closure" and "bibliographic exclusion". Young scholars are taught to be
narrow-minded and adopt a priori positions, talking at rather than with past and present
practitioners of other research approaches.
2. Archaeological theory renews itself by elimination rather than modification of
previous ideas and approaches - in other words it is not cumulative. Earlier and immediately
preceding theorists are declared to have been "in error" rather than laying relevant bits of
road for the onward march of the discipline.
3. Given that archaeology is not a very numerous academic community in any one
country, that the number of active theorists is a small minority of even that number, we find
that "discourse" in archaeological theory tends towards the monologue or hegemony by the
generational avant-garde. Diversity of approaches and concepts, encouraging self-critical
debate and discouraging strategies of intellectual domination, are severely inhibited.
4. Researchers do not wish to appear fossilized when confronted by the next package
of "isms", so tend to adopt them uncritically. They also find it difficult to pursue their
accompanying (usually esoteric) bibliography. This latter situation is especially disturbing
since close reading of the reception of the same novelties in other disciplines will reveal
weaknesses and counter-arguments. Ironically archaeology catches up with all its borrowings
five or often ten years after their arrival in related academic subjects, usually when the
relevant movement has spent its force and been replaced by the next fad; we should actually
be in an ideal position to evaluate the new approach with the benefit of its accumulated
critical reception elsewhere. In fact, this never seems to happen, and the new "virus" is
imported in pure, virulent form without consideration of its recognized inadequacies (the
antidote).
The arrival on the theoretical horizon of new ideas with potential application to
archaeological problems is nonetheless not only to be welcomed, but active engagement with
their content is the only basis for progress in the discipline's interpretative abilities. However,
limiting our awareness to a very narrow range of novelties adopted by a dominant elite of
theorists to the exclusion of other influences cannot be healthy for the discipline, especially
if even this package requires intellectual conformity rather than critical engagement, and an
active disengagement from earlier theoretical discourses.
Perhaps I could illustrate the obvious shortcomings of our current situation with
examples of contemporary applications of the Post-Processual mini-paradigm. "Appropriate
topics" for young researchers at present (politically-correct topics?) are the Holy Trinity of
Gender, Ethnicity and Power. Basically these seem wide-ranging, intriguing research themes,
where archaeology could add its vast time dimension to illuminate discussions in other
disciplines. The problem seems to be, when one runs through published work or listens to
conference papers addressing these topics, that adoption of these slogans seems to require
suspension of most of our critical faculties. As has frequently been observed in other
disciplines, in situations of hegemonic discourse the researcher who wishes to stay - or
become - "a player" in the eyes of the theoretical community, is primarily concerned to
establish his/her credentials by appropriate citation of the dominant doctrine and texts, rather
than through taking an autonomous, critical stance to both the latest and older concepts and
approaches.
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Let us begin with Gender. Feminism is the main stimulus in contemporary society that
has encouraged a major interest in the Archaeology of Gender. There are many fascinating
aspects of past human activity where a focus on gender could be illuminating for an
understanding of the entire society. In practice, almost all archaeological applications so far
are more concerned to demonstrate how women archaeologists have been unjustly
subordinated in the past and even recently, and how men have dominated socio-economic
life in virtually every historic or prehistoric context reconstructable. These claims appear to
me incontestable, and worth stating. They are also blindingly obvious. My criticism of current
research is that it generally goes no further than stating these truisms and decorating them
with relevant confirmatory data; there seems to be no impetus to analyse the reasons for these
situations, rather the main role of the archaeological theorist is to adopt a public
politically-correct stance.
Now I want to know how and why men have continually assumed physical, social,
economic and intellectual dominance in human societies. Since current Post-Processual
thought rests on the a priori assumption of human culture as the unique focus of past human
behaviour, dismissing biological factors, and at the same time rejects traditional
anthropological Functionalism for explaining recurrent structural regularities in human
culture, our analytical apparatus for getting deeper into the origins and persistence of Gender
Inequality is remarkably limited. It should not therefore surprise us that the Archaeology of
Gender remains mostly posturing and has taught us little new that is relevant to deeper
understanding of these fundamental aspects of human social life. The limitations of the
"Culturalist" view are clearest when we are told that "Gender is a purely cultural
phenomenon": the entire point of privileging the topic at the present time is thereby removed,
since it is surely the fact that Women as a biological category at the phenotype level have
throughout history and prehistory suffered inequality from Men that makes the subject of
major importance. The only way forward is to try and relate all the possible components in
Gender to one another - and this requires giving serious attention to language, symbolism,
social functionalism and biological influences. The culturalist position has to be seen as
a useful addition to the analysis, not the only viable approach.
Concerning Ethnicity there appears to be an equivalent narrowing of the mind towards
adopting a single, uncritical position "approved" by a theoretical elite. Multiculturalism and
ethnic rights are in the driving seat, threatening to box the archaeologist in from both practical
and theoretical directions. Let us consider, for example, fieldwork on sites, especially burial
sites, which modern ethnic communities treasure for political, religious or emotional reasons.
We will surely want to support a proper sensitivity to the rights and wishes of the group
concerned. But there does exist a real danger that further collaboration could result in the
archaeologist becoming entirely compromised by pressure or encouragement to adhere to an
appropriate "story" for the ethnic community. These issues can be seen clearly in Olsen's
(1986) paper on the Saami of Norway. Here it seems that all that potentially divides the
politically-correct archaeologist from the Nazi racist archaeologist is being on the "right side"
rather than having a more objective and less biassed methodology.
Once again what I want to know about ethnicity has to do with the comparison of
"official" coherence and actual cultural variety, how "tight" and closed supposed ethnic
communities are over time and space, the relationships between biological variance and
cultural variance, and the realtionships between language, culture and biology. All of these
factors are essential to analyze the phenomena of "ethnicity", but such a range of approaches
will be absent from current Post-Processual theory.
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Finally Power. A preoccupation with dominance structures typifies much current
theorizing in archaeology. Revealing the power structure on an excavation (Tilley 1989), in
the publication of research, or uncovering power machinations in the history of archaeology,
these form one arena of recent commentary. The other is made up of underlining inequality
in the development of past societies. Jameson (1984) and Harvey (1989) have argued, to my
mind highly convincingly, that the many disciplinary versions of Post-Modernism's
obsession with deconstructing all human relationships to forms of domination is an
Expressionist form of anguish for academics who feel powerless against reactionary,
anti-intellectual governments, see themselves (perhaps rightly) as totally uninfluential in the
public sphere, and have lost confidence in any affirmative ideologies or belief systems. In
a sense it is a form of paranoia, and is never far from the desire to "take power" back from
any institution in sight (Shanks - Tilley 1989); yet with no remote chance of archaeology
promoting a social or political revolution, the only avenue is a playful deconstruction of the
Past, past archaeologists and current archaeological practice as power games. Archaeological
theory, on the other hand, seen as a power game, does not receive such attention, since each
generation's theoretical elite aspires to dominate the discourse of theory.
Breaking the mould: how to make archaeological theory really free
I am very doubtful that archaeological interpretations can really progress unless we "smash
the system" of generational theory replacement, guru-worship and intellectual dominance
structures that have so bedevilled the discipline since the last War (for before the New
Functionalism
Subjectivism Structuralism
Figure 1. Metaphors of archaeology.
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Archaeology the "Great Men" also left little sunlight beneath their shadows). And actually
it won't be difficult to achieve. A thoughtful perusal of Figure 1 is a. good place to start.
Before I discuss its intrinsic value it is worth mentioning two points that its appearance in
this essay provokes. Firstly, the lesson in pluralism it offers was published for geographers
in 1982 (Harrison - Livingstone 1982, Fig. 1.4), and marked a mature reaction to the potential
warfare between what was by then the very old New Geography and the already fallible
Postmodern Geography. Secondly, I reproduced the diagram in its original form ("Metaphors
of Geography") in a review of archaeological theory in 1986, which has remained largely
unread (despite appearing in the well-known BAR series) for the simple reason that it took
an independent stance from Post-Processualism and was therefore not worth reading (Bintliff
1986).
But let us return to the Figure itself, which delightfully flattens time and tradition into
a topological surface where the choice and preference is Your's. In studying past human
societies we must have the freedom to see how far a purely Functional, purely Subjective or
purely Structuralist (i.e. Levi-Straussian "Structuralism" or Marxism) approach can take us
in understanding our data. We can also choose to take intermediate positions on the triangular
diagram. And these operational decisions need never be permanent ideological stances - for
certainly with a particular culture or period a shift of emphasis will prove enlightening.
Moreover, let us give researchers maximum freedom: we should encourage scholarly
occupation of all the extremes, to see how far those approaches take us, at the same time as
we teach and learn ourselves from balancing from a midpoint the insights gained from every
sector of the triangular surface. It is difficult to deny that the history of research in
archaeology and history has made it clear that every area of this diagram has a necessary
part to play in accounting for the nature of the human past; we merely need to admit this
publicly and encourage a new research pluralism - Vive la différence!
My second diagram, Figure 2, also aims to flatten time, by emphasizing how the
contemporary antagonism between Processualism and Post-Processualism is nothing more
than the endless dualism in Western thought between the Empirical-Positivist and
Romantic-Idealist philosophies. In the recent paper from which this illustration derives
(Bintliff 1993) I have argued that the great C20th thinker Wittgenstein broke the force of this
polarity with his concept of complementary discourses, each employing separate verbal and
technical "toolkits". These mutually-complementary discourses represent contrasting ways
of looking at the world, ask distinct types of questions about it, and expect distinct types of
answers (Monk 1990).
Wittgenstein's early work, summarized in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", was
focussed on simplifying the role of Philosophy and clarifying the way our words reflect the
world around us. A potent image for him was seeing in a court case how model cars were
used to reconstruct the scene of an accident. Fundamentally he argued that statements we
make are either expressions of belief or ideology (in which case they cannot be further
analysed, as equivalent to metaphysical sense perceptions), or reducible to "pictures" of the
real world (objects in relation to one another or "states of affairs"). In both forms of
expression we can clear up the confusion of language and philosophy, the "meanings of
things" by rapidly stripping down people's statements to either (a) a person making
a metaphysical credo, or (b) a person trying with varying degrees of success to describe the
sense scenario of objects in relation to each other (clearly the "thing-language" of science












ARCHAEOLOGY AS A HUMAN SCIENCE OF
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DISCOURSES
Figure 2. The future of archaeological theory.
was the best approximation to reality). For both uses of language Wittgenstein had the simple
advice: "Don't think, look!"
In his later work, summarized in the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein
produced a much more complex model of language. Although apparently rejecting his earlier
work, we can see him building on its insights to produce a more flexible approach. We might
usefully remind ourselves of the "cars" that represented a past scenario in court: now, when
the models are being moved about to represent the world, Wittgenstein argues that (just as
actually might occur in a trial), different people will offer variant interpretations of what is
happening. He sees these different discourses as a range of games (language-games) or
individual items in a toolkit (as if in a carpenter's bag, for example). The separate
language-games have different social roles to fulfil in society, and use the "objects in
space/states of affairs" flexibly for complementary purposes. Each discourse has its own
vocabulary and rules of valid expression or performance for participants.
It is essential to realize that Wittgenstein is far from proposing a relativistic view of
reality, in fact he always grounds these discourses in the world of public, perceived action.
If someone performs within ideological/metaphysical discourse, they are expressing
a transcendental sense perception to other listeners in a specific real time and place. As
remarked earlier, it is entirely inappropriate to mix such a discourse with the "thing-language
game" of science, whose task it is to parameterize "objects in space" in technical ways.
Wittgenstein claims, I think rightly, that "hidden mental states" are inaccessible to discussion
or analysis, so that the world works and is interprétable only through social action - either
language, symbolism or other non-verbal behaviour.
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If we accept these penetrating ideas from someone widely considered to be the greatest
C20th philosopher, what are the direct implications for Archaeology? Let us collapse the
generational antagonisms and the millennial Idealist-Rationalist polarity into a series of
complementary discourses, language-games, or a toolkit. The history of Archaeology clearly
reveals a series of ways of looking at the past which have fluctuated in favour and popularity,
and which now deserve a place in a constellation of major discourses appropriate to
a pluralistic discipline. These discourses can further be justified through comparison with
related disciplines and their constellations (cf. Figure I):
A Science discourse - characteristic for most archaeological activity is the revealing,
measuring and describing of past human "states of affairs" in "thing" language;
A Biological discourse - from the beginning of Archaeology as a serious discipline in
the mid-C19lh, there has existed a discourse viewing human activity from a human
biological, adaptive, and more recently a human ecological perspective;
A Functionalist discourse - past human behaviour can be comprehended through
a perspective derived from traditional Social Anthropology, in which human actions are
moulded by adaptive selection favouring the maintenance of communal social structures;
A Culturalist discourse - never absent from archaeological interpretation but variable
in popularity is the approach in which human behaviour is primarily controlled through
a distinctly human cultural repertoire (verbal, symbolic pictures of the world);
A Political discourse - human behaviour, past and present, can be discussed within the
language game of formal political positions and stated ideologies (eg. Marxism, Feminism);
A Religious discourse - our approach to past societies can be analysed as evidence of
forms of engagement with supernatural beings or forces.
We are led from the wisdom of Wittgenstein to demand the freedom of plurality: we
need the extremes of Idealist thinkers remote from ficldwork, or laboratory archaeological
scientists with neither knowledge nor interest in Critical Theory, just as much as we expect
those who generalize from such studies or write period and subject syntheses to occupy the
middle ground and weave creatively from all the separate strands of insight each kind of
archaeological discourse comes up with.
Allegiance to the dominant mini-paradigm, or the appeal to the "authority" of leading
figures in our discipline or outside it, are poor ways to justify the new things we want to say
about the past. We need:
- competing ideas and data;
- yet these are worthless (contra H odder 1993) unless we have shared concepts on how
we should evaluate the agreement between the data and alternative or complementary
interpretative models;
- most of all we need intellectual breadth through not excluding the many, equally
valid ways to contribute to the diverse discourses that are archaeological interpretation.
When in 1971 Evzen Neustupnj accurately chastized archaeologists for forming two
antagonistic and non-communicating blocs, neither of which commanded an adequate
approach, he hoped for a future total integration - a project the New Archaeology made
significant but not decisive advances towards. My own appeal would be to stimulate even
greater diversity of views and approaches, whilst at the same time hammering home to every
archaeological practitioner that no one discourse is more privileged than the other, and that
the complexity of human societies can only be comprehended through pluralistic researches
complementing each other in the distinct insights they contribute.
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